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NOTES
General Laws, Neutral Principles, and the Free
Exercise Clause
I. INTRODUCTION
In a landmark 1959 article Herbert Wechsler pleaded for a Su-
preme Court commitment to make "principled" decisions.' A prin-
cipled decision, in Wechsler's view, "is one that rests on reasons
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their gener-
ality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved." 2 Wechsler did not contend that principled decisions
would ignore underlying value choices.3 Instead, he argued that the
Court had a responsibility to present adequate analysis, in terms of
neutral principles, in support of its decisions. Such neutral princi-
ples, although resting on underlying value judgments, should be
principles upon which there is a consensus embracing both sides of
a given controversy.5 The advantage of this decisionmaking process
presumably will be greater predictability and better acceptance of
particular results.6
This Note examines several recent Supreme Court decisions
considering the first amendment's free exercise clause7 to determine
whether, collectively, the decisions are results of principled deci-
sionmaking. During the past two decades the Court has had four
significant opportunities to deal with the free exercise clause. 8 In all
1. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
2. Id. at 19. Wechsler goes on to say that "[w]hen no sufficient reasons of this kind
can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government or of
a state, those choices must, of course, survive." Id.
3. Wechsler's view, at least as expanded by some of his followers, has been criticized
as an attempt to supply the Court with fundamental values otherwise unavailable or difficult
to obtain. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term; Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 32-33 (1978).
4. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 21.
5. Wechsler's discussion makes it clear that neutral principles are those upon which
there is a consensus. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 9-10, 23-24, 31, 34.
6. Id. at 20-23.
7. The constitutional amendment guaranteeing freedom of religion contains both an
establishment clause and a free exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
8. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961).
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but one,9 the Court made important statements about the constitu-
tional protection afforded the free exercise of religious belief. In each
case the basic issue was the same: was interference with the exercise
of religion unconstitutional when that interference resulted from the
application of a general law that promoted a valid public policy and
was nondiscriminatory on its face?10 In short, was unintended and
incidental interference by an otherwise valid law nonetheless uncon-
stitutional?
Divergent decisions by the Court in these cases, marked by
differences in their underlying rationales, suggest initially that prin-
cipled decisionmaking in this context has been lacking. This Note
explores the results in the free exercise decisions, concluding that
the Court has failed to establish a clear set of neutral principles in
this area. The Note then proposes neutral principles that could
enhance both the predictability and the acceptability of future free
exercise decisions.
IX. FREE EXERCISE DECISIONS
A. Background
In Reynolds v. United States," the Court first distinguished
between religious belief and action stemming from religious belief.
Reynolds, a member of the Mormon Church, had been charged with
bigamy after entering into a second marriage pursuant to church
doctrine, which encouraged polygamy. In upholding the bigamy
statute over Reynolds' contention that he was entitled to an excep-
tion based upon his right to follow freely his religious beliefs, the
Court reviewed the origins of the free exercise clause and stated that
"[laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may
with practices.' '1 2 The decision thus separated belief, over which the
government was prohibited from exercising control, from action,
over which government might exercise control if the action was "in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.' 3
The Court retreated from the rigid dichotomy between belief
and action in Cantwell v. Connecticut.4 Cantwell and other Jeho-
9. In Bishop of Chicago the Court's decision rested on statutory interpretation and did
not reach the constitutional issues.
10. In the interest of simplicity, this type of law will hereinafter be referred to as a
"general nondiscriminatory law."
11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12. Id. at 166.
13. Id. at 164.
14. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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vah's Witnesses were distributing leaflets and soliciting contribu-
tions on the streets of New Haven. A Connecticut statute forbade
solicitation unless the solicitor's cause was approved beforehand by
the secretary of the public welfare council. Noting that the constitu-
tional provision on religion had a "double aspect," tlhe Court stated
that "it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship. . . ... as well as "safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion." Thus, the first
amendment embraces two concepts: "freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society.' 5 The Court thus left intact the protection of
belief recognized in Reynolds but began to clarify the status of ac-
tion motivated by religious belief. Without suggesting that such
action lacked any constitutional protection when the action was
violative of social duty or subversive of good order, the Court stated
that "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."'" The
Court then held that the Connecticut statute unconstitutionally
infringed the free exercise of religion because it gave a public official
discretionary power to determine whether a given cause was reli-
gious."
In rendering its decision, the Cantwell Court emphasized that
what rendered the Connecticut statute unconstitutional was its
imposition of a religious test. Such a test invalidated the statute
regardless of whether the law reasonably regulated the religious ac-
tivity. In so holding, however, the Court stated that a regulation of
solicitation that did not impose a religious test and did not
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds would not be
open to constitutional challenge, even though the solicitation was
for a religious purpose." Thus, Cantwell may be read as holding not
only that a specific religious test is unconstitutional regardless of
the validity of the general law, but also that a reasonable interfer-
ence stemming from an otherwise valid general law is constitu-
tional. The decision left unclear, however, the meaning of
"reasonable" in the context of a general nondiscriminatory law that
has an incidental and unintended effect on the activity of a particu-
lar religious group.
15. Id. at 303-04.
16. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).




B. Braunfeld v. Brown
The question left unanswered in Cantwell was raised in
Braunfeld v. Brown." Braunfeld and other members of the Ortho-
dox Jewish faith were retail sellers of clothing and home furnishings.
Because their faith required that they refrain from work on Satur-
day, appellants partially compensated for lost Saturday business by
remaining open on Sunday. Pennsylvania enacted a statute, how-
ever, that prohibited retail sales on Sunday. Appellants challenged
the statute as a violation of the free exercise clause, arguing that
enforcement of the Sunday closing law in effect required them either
to open on Saturday in contravention of their religious beliefs, or to
suffer economic losses sufficient to cause them to cease doing busi-
ness.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren held that the
statute was not an unconstitutional interference with the appel-
lants' free exercise rights.2 After reviewing Reynolds and Cantwell,
the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania statute neither made
criminal any religious belief or opinion nor forced anyone to em-
brace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict
with his or her religious tenets.2 ' Neither did the statute make un-
lawful any religious practice of appellants: "the Sunday law simply
regulates a secular activity and . . . operates so as to make the
practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.
12
The Court might have been saying that when a law only indi-
rectly impacts on the free exercise of religion, a "rational basis" for
the law is sufficient to protect it from being declared unconstitu-
tional.? In discussing whether Pennsylvania's law should have had
19. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In addition to the free exercise challenge, appellants claimed
that the statute constituted a law respecting an establishment of religion and violated the
equal protection clause.
20. Id. at 609.
21. Id. at 603. In reaching its conclusion the Court reviewed prior cases. In addition to
Reynolds and Cantwell, the Court referred to West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state law requiring a flag salute and pledge of allegiance in public schools
held unconstitutional when enforced against students whose religious beliefs prohibited flag
salutes), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute making it a crime for a
girl under eighteen years of age to sell literature in public places upheld despite fact that as
a child of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith she believed it was her religious dutyto perform that
work). The Court noted that in Barnette the law required a student to act against religious
belief, whereas in Prince the religious practice conflicted with the public interest. 366 U.S.
at 604-05.
22. 366 U.S. at 605.
23. The "rational basis" test was developed in the context of substantive due process
and the regulation of economic interests. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
in which the Court held that "[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements
of due process are satisfied. . . ." Id. at 537.
[Vol. 33:149
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an exception for those who observed a different day of rest, for
example, the Court stated that this "may well be the wiser solution
to the problem" but noted that its concern was "not with the wis-
dom of legislation but with its constitutional limitation." 4 Alterna-
tively, the Court may have been applying a "balancing test," in
which the Court weighed the needs of the state against the restric-
tions imposed on the individual.2s This view draws support from the
fact that, as justification for upholding the statutes, the Court listed
a series of problems that might occur if Pennsylvania were constitu-
tionally required to make exceptions for those whose religion re-
quired an alternate day of rest.2" What is clear, however, is that the
Court did not consider the Pennsylvania law an unreasonable in-
fringement of appellants' rights to the free exercise of their religion.
Noting the great number of divergent religious beliefs, the Court
said that "it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators
enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an
economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others." 27
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart 28 dissented. Justice
Brennan's dissent points out that, when fundamental liberties such
as the freedom of religion are concerned, neither a finding that a
"challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate legislative
end" nor that the "State's interest is substantial and important" is
sufficient to allow infringement of the liberty.29 Instead, only a
"compelling state interest"3 would suffice to override the constitu-
24. 366 U.S. at 608.
25. The "balancing test" is usually associated with procedural due process controver-
sies in which the state's needs are weighed against the harm done to an individual liberty or
interest. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
26. The Court adverted to the possibility of discriminatory competitive advantage if
nonSabbatarian observers could stay open on that day, the possibility that the state would
have to inquire unconstitutionally into the sincerity of such persons' religious beliefs, and the
possibility of discriminatory hiring practices by Sunday employers. 366 U.S. at 608-09.
27. Id. at 606.
28. The Brennan and Stewart dissents follow the majority opinion in Braunfeld. Id. at
610-16. The Douglas dissent is incorporated in his dissent to McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 561-81 (1961), another Sunday closing law decision that was handed down the same day
as Braunfeld.
29. 366 U.S. at 611.
30. The "compelling state interest" test is the first part of the "strict scrutiny" proce-
dure that was developed in the context of equal protection controversies involving either
suspect classifications or fundamental liberties. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663
(1966). The second part of "strict scrutiny" review requires that the means utilized be the
"least restrictive alternative." See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term; Fore-
word: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. RFv. 1 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969). In addition to the equal protection cases, the Court has sug-
1980]
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tional guarantee.3 ' Although Justice Stewart claims that he
"substantially" agrees with Justice Brennan's view, he does not
specifically refer to a "compelling state interest" standard, but
emphasizes only that the Pennsylvania law "compels an Orthodox
Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic sur-
vival," a choice that "no State can constitutionally demand.
'32
Thus it is unclear whether Stewart considered the infringement
merely "unreasonable" and therefore unconstitutional, or agreed
with Brennan that the infringement was unconstitutional because
there was no "compelling state interest." By contrast, Justice Doug-
las' dissent claimed that the choice of Sunday as a day of rest was
basically a choice made because of the majority's religious views.
33
Justice Douglas thus saw the establishment and free exercise
clauses as inextricably interwoven:
There is an "establishment" of religion in the constitutional sense if any
practice of any religious group has the sanction of law behind it. There is an
interference with the "free exercise" of religion if what in conscience one can
do or omit doing is required because of the religious scruples of the com-
munity.
3
In his concurring opinion3 1 Justice Frankfurter, more clearly
than the majority opinion, took the position that, on balance, the
harm done by the state did not outweigh the community interests
advanced by the statutes. Justice Frankfurter phrased the constitu-
tional question as: "[i]n view of the importance of the community
interests which must be weighed in the balance, is the disadvantage
wrought by the non-exempting Sunday statutes an impermissible
imposition upon the Sabbatarian's religious freedom?" 31 His conclu-
gested that "strict scrutiny" applies to substantive due process challenges of governmental
interference with individual rights contained in the first ten amendments of the Constitution.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). More recently, the Court
has applied the "compelling state interest" test in substantive due process controversies
involving fundamental rights other than those specifically listed in the Constitution. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 366 U.S. at 613-14.
32. Id. at 616.
33. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 573.
34. Id. at 576-77.
35. Id. at 459-560. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence to Braunfeld appears as part of the
McGowan decision. Justice Harlan joined in the opinion. In this extraordinarily long opinion
Justice Frankfurter emphasizes (a) a distinction between an impact on religion made by
statutes with religious objectives (which are constitutionally prohibited) and an impact made
by statutes with purely secular objectives (which are not necessarily prohibited) and (b) a
review of the development of Sunday laws in England and the United States, aimed at
showing the present purely secular purpose of the Sunday laws.
36. Id. at 522. Justice Frankfurter's specific words were: "[o]n the basis of the criteria
for determining constitutionality, as opposed to what one might desire as a matter of legisla-
tive policy, a contrary conclusion cannot be reached." Id.
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sion was that it was not.
Thus in Braunfeld, a majority of the Court saw no unconstitu-
tional infringement of religious rights. There was, however, no sub-
stantial agreement on the basis for this opinion. Chief Justice War-
ren's majority opinion left unclear whether laws indirectly impact-
ing on religious practice need only a rational basis or must satisfy a
balancing test in which the individual's right to free exercise is
weighed against the public interest promoted by the law. Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan applied a balancing test. Justice Stewart
found the impact unreasonable without clarifying his basis for that
judgment. Justice Douglas did not engage in a discussion of free
exercise rights, because he considered the law void under the estab-
lishment clause. Finally, Justice Brennan found the law violative
of the free exercise clause because there was no compelling state
interest. There was in short, no agreement on the principles under-
lying the decision.
C. Sherbert v. Verner
Two years after Braunfeld the Court dramatically changed
direction in Sherbert v. Verner.37 Sherbert was a member of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church, whose religious doctrine prohibited
Saturday labor. After being discharged and failing to obtain other
work because local employers were hiring only those able and willing
to work a six-day week, Sherbert applied for unemployment com-
pensation. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act
provided, however, that claimants were ineligible for benefits if they
failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work when
offered by the unemployment office or the employer. The Employ-
ment Security Commission found that Sherbert's refusal to work on
Saturday brought her within this restriction and declared her ineli-
gible for unemployment benefits. Sherbert challenged these find-
ings as an unconstitutional infringement upon her free exercise
rights. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Sherbert's chal-
lenge, however, and upheld the findings of the Commission. The
United States Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan asked two questions:
First, was Sherbert's disqualification by the State an infringement
of her free exercise rights?; and second, if so, was any incidental
burden on those rights justified by a "compelling state interest in
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). During the intervening period Justices Frankfurter and Whit-
taker had retired and were replaced by Justices Goldberg and White.
1980]
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to regulate[?]"3" After finding that the disqualification was clearly
a burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion," Justice Brennan
found no compelling state interest to justify that burden." The ma-
jority distinguished Braunfeld on the grounds that there was a "less
direct burden upon religious practices" in that case and also that
the Pennsylvania statute in Braunfeld was "saved by a countervail-
ing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a strong
state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers.""
According to the Sherbert majority, Braunfeld stated that the
"secular objective could be achieved . . . only by declaring Sunday
to be that day of rest."4
Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Braunfeld, concurred in
the result in Sherbert but did not join the majority opinion. Citing
two establishment clause decisions,43 Justice Stewart expressed con-
cern that the Sherbert decision required a state to acknowledge and
protect religion in a way that contradicted these holdings.44 Justice
Stewart also questioned the consistency of Sherbert and Braunfeld.
Pointing out that the monetary impact on the appellant in Sherbert
was considerably less than that in Braunfeld, Stewart concluded
that in order to reach its conclusion in Sherbert, "the Court must
explicitly reject the reasoning of Braunfeld v. Brown. 
' ' 5
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented. Justice
Harlan's basic point was that the South Carolina law made ineligi-
38. Id. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
39. 374 U.S. at 403-06.
40. Id. at 406-07.
41. Id. at 408.
42. Id. at 408-09. This contention by the majority seems clearly incorrect. The
Braunfeld Court found nothing as strong as Brennan says it did. To the contrary, the
Braunfeld Court was explicitly aware of the fact that 21 of the 34 states with Sunday closing
laws did not find the need for a common day of rest so compelling that they could not allow
exceptions for non-Sabbatarians. See 366 U.S. at 614. Thus, rather than finding a compelling
state interest, the Braunfeld Court's position was that it was not unreasonable when Pennsyl-
vania failed to do as other states had in allowing an exception. The simple fact is that the
Braunfeld majority was not looking for the presence or absence of a "compelling state inter-
est" as the Sherbert majority implied. Only Justice Brennan, in the Braunfeld minority, had
specifically stated that the "compelling state interest" test was the appropriate one. See text
accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
43. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the establishment clause
prohibited a state from requiring that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's
Prayer be recited in the public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that
the establishment clause prohibited state officials from composing an official state prayer and
requiring its recitation daily in the public schools).
44. 374 U.S. at 414. Characterizing the Court's approach to the establishment clause
as "not only insensitive, but positively wooden," Stewart focused primarily on the need for
the Court to re-examine its establishment clause views rather than on any mistake in the
Sherbert result. Id.
45. Id. at 418.
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ble those who for "personal reasons" were not available for work. By
holding that an exception must be carved out for those whose per-
sonal reasons were religious ones, the Court had, in Harlan's view,
necessarily overruled Braunfeld.4' Furthermore, compelling the
state to carve out an exception to its general rule of eligibility went
beyond the constitutional requirements for special treatment of reli-
gion, which, Harlan stated, are "few and far between."47 Justice
Harlan thus accepted Justice Stewart's point that Sherbert con-
flicted with the Court's establishment clause opinions, but differed
from Justice Stewart" in arguing that the conflict necessitated affir-
mation of the lower court in Sherbert rather than re-examination of
the establishment clause reasoning.
Although the Sherbert majority stopped short of adopting the
reasoning of Justice Douglas,4' the Court nevertheless substantially
agreed that the "compelling state interest" test applies whenever a
general nondiscriminatory law impacts, albeit indirectly, on an in-
dividual's right to the free exercise of religion. Thus, a definite prin-
ciple underlies the decision. It is unclear, however, whether such a
principle can be called a "neutral" one,"0 because application of the
"compelling state interest" test almost always means that the gov-
ernmental action in question will be found constitutionally lacking.
It seems unlikely that there could be a consensus embracing both
sides of a given controversy if one side was aware that application
of the allegedly "neutral" principle meant almost certain rejection
of its arguments.5'
D. Wisconsin v. Yoder
Nine years after Sherbert the Court again dealt with a general
nondiscriminatory law and the free exercise clause in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 2 Several members of the Old Order Amish religion and the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church including Yoder had been
46. Id. at 421.
47. Id. at 423.
48. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
49. Justice Douglas would apparently allow no interference, even for a compelling state
interest: "The result turns not on the degree of injury, which may indeed be nonexistent by
ordinary standards. The harm is the interference with the individual's scruples or consci-
ence-an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences off from government."
374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).
50. See text accompanying note 5 supra. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-62 (1969); Gunther, supra note 30, at 8-10.
51. A principle would presumably not lose its neutrality simply because the logical
application of it in a given case would lead to the defeat of one side. It would lose its
neutrality, however, if its application ordinarily worked against the same side.
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1980]
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fined for refusing to send their children to school until they reached
the age of sixteen as required by Wisconsin law." The Wisconsin
Supreme Court sustained the parents' free exercise claim. 4 The
United States Supreme Court was nearly unanimous55 in affirming
the lower courts, but failed to apply the same "compelling state
interest" standard that had been applied in Sherbert.5"
The Court initially stated that in order for Wisconsin to compel
school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such
attendance interfered with legitimate religious practice "it must
appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of reli-
gious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause."5 After examining the record,58 the
Court concluded that there was a clear encroachment upon the right
of free exercise of religious beliefs.
Given an encroachment on respondents' free exercise rights, the
issue became whether the encroachment was justified by the State's
interest in universal compulsory formal secondary education to age
sixteen. The Court noted that the State's interest stemmed from a
53. The children had attended local public schools through the eighth grade. They were
fourteen and fifteen at the time their parents declined to send them to the local high school
for further education. Id. at 207 n.1.
54. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
55. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Only Justice Douglas dissented, contending that the
children's rather than the parents' rights should have been considered. Because only one of
the children, Frieda Yoder, stated that her views were in accord with those of her parents,
Douglas concurred with the majority opinion only as to Yoder and dissented as to the others.
406 U.S. at 243. Douglas also questioned the majority's idea of what constituted "religious"
belief. Id. at 247-49. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, recently appointed, did not take part in
the decision.
56. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
57. 406 U.S. at 214. Although this language might suggest an application of the
"compelling state interest" test, the comparison of the competing interests, as well as other
language in the opinion, make it clear that a "balancing" test was being employed. See note
59 infra.
58. [The unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and reli-
gious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained
faith, pervading and regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that
enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth
grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious
beliefs.
406 U.S. at 219.
Experts had testified that the Amish religion "pervades and determines virtually their
entire way of life." Id. at 216. The Amish way of life was that of a simple, close-knit com-
munity that resisted the innovations of the modem world. Secondary schools were said to
expose Amish children "to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary
to beliefs," and thus substantially to interfere "with the religious development of the Amish
child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community . "Id. at
218.
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legitimate desire that citizens be prepared to participate effectively
and intelligently in the political system and be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society. 59 Finding these goals valid, the
Court nevertheless concluded that the State's interest in education
did not extend to requiring Amish children's attendance to age six-
teen. 0
Yoder's significance lies in its substantial retreat from the
"compelling state interest" standard of Sherbert. The Yoder court
inquired whether the state's interest in education was "sufficient"
to "override" the admitted encroachment on free exercise rights.
The "sufficiency" required, however, was plainly not of the all but
inflexible "compelling" variety. Instead, the Court was balancing
the competing interests. This is reflected throughout the Court's
opinion. For example, in discussing whether general nondiscrimi-
natory laws can be held unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonethe-
less offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutral-
ity if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.""1 The Court
also argued that "[b]y preserving doctrinal flexibility and recog-
nizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Reli-
gion Clauses 'we have been able to chart a course that preserved the
autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any sem-
blance of established religion.' "62 Further, the Court noted that
"[the] courts must move with great circumspection in performing
the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social
concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from gener-
ally applicable educational requirements." 3
The general tenor of the Court's discussion, however, makes it
less than clear whether a "balancing" test is to be used in all cases
in which there is a conflict between the free exercise clause and a
general nondiscriminatory law or whether the test is proper only for
those isolated instances in which the secular and religious interests
were both of exceptional importance. Although the Yoder majority
relied heavily on the special characteristics of the Amish religion,
and the interests of parents in retaining control over the education
59. Id. at 221.
60. Id. at 224-25, 228-29. The Court noted that respondents had demonstrated the
"adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of
precisely those overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of compul-
sory high school education." Id. at 235.
61. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). Justice White added that "[c]ases such as this one
inevitably call for a delicate balancing of important but conflicting interests." Id. at 237.
1980]
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of their children, the Court emphasized that the state's interest in
providing education was also substantial." Because important in-
terests were present on both sides in Yoder, it is possible to construe
the decision as limited to complicated conflicts between multiple
fundamental rights and substantial state interests. It is also possible
to read the opinion as meaning that, even when the state interest is
compelling, infringement of free exercise rights is unjustified when
there is a reasonable alternative that does not impair religious
rights." In the latter case, the Court may have meant nothing more
than the Amish style of informal "learning through doing" was a
reasonable alternative to the Wisconsin requirement."
E. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
The Court's confusion over the basis of its free exercise views
continued in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.7 The National
Labor Relations Board had certified unions as bargaining agents for
lay teachers in secondary schools operated by the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Chicago and by the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend,
Indiana. When respondents refused to recognize and bargain with
the unions, the NLRB issued cease-and-desist orders. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's or-
ders on the ground that the NLRB's assumption of jurisdiction was
foreclosed by the religion clauses of the first amendment." The Su-
preme Court, however, affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision on
purely statutory grounds."
64. The Court, noting that "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State," nevertheless stated that even this paramount responsibility was "made
to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated
system." Id. at 213. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
65. The Court, by allowing a "reasonable" alternative, was not simply employing the
second part of the "strict scrutiny" standard, because that would have required the Court to
speak in terms of the "least restrictive alternative." See note 30 supra.
66. 406 U.S. at 212. The Wisconsin law did provide for certain recognized exceptions,
one of which was for "instruction . . . elsewhere than at school." This exception, however,
had to be "approved by the state superintendent as substantially equivalent to instruction
given to children of like ages in the public or private schools where such children reside,"
which, on its face, would not cover the practice of the Amish. Id. at 207-08 n.2.
67. 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979).
68. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (1977). The Seventh Circuit
also rejected the Board's jurisdiction on the ground that the NLRB standard failed to provide
a workable guide for the exercise of its discretion in assuming jurisdiction. Id. at 1118. In
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, Archdiocesan High Schools, 216 N.L.R.B. 249
(1975), the Board had explained that its policy was to decline jurisdiction over religiously
sponsored schools "only when they are completely religious, not just religiously associated."
Id. at 250. In practice the distinction excluded seminaries but not religiously sponsored high
schools.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1322. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger, joined
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Despite its failure to reach the constitutional questions, the
majority touched upon the issues in dicta. Inexplicably, the Court
did not look to Braunfeld, Sherbert, or Yoder for the applicable
standard. Instead, the Court cited language from an establishment
clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman.7" In Lemon the Court had held
that a Rhode Island law providing a fifteen percent salary supple-
ment for teachers in nonpublic schools and a Pennsylvania law pro-
viding for state reimbursement to nonpublic schools for courses in
specific secular subjects were both unconstitutional under the reli-
gion clauses. 7' One ground for the decision was the prospect of
"entanglement" of the state in religious activities.7 1 In order to avoid
the payment of state funds for any activities that fostered religion,
both laws provided for surveillance of the program by state authori-
ties. It was this continuing interaction between state authorities and
the religious schools that the Court deemed "excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church.
' 73
Without actually holding that such entanglement would be
present if the NLRB took jurisdiction over labor disputes in church-
related schools, the Bishop of Chicago Court nevertheless indicated
that it considered the NLRB involvement similar to that proscribed
in Lemon.7 The entanglement in Lemon, however, involved con-
stant state surveillance of teachers who, because of the difficulty of
compartmentalizing their secular knowledge from their religious
beliefs, might have injected religiously inspired views into their
by Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented.
70. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The language (entanglement) initially was used by the Court
in another establishment clause case, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). The
idea, however, is a hybrid of both free exercise and establishment concepts. See text accom-
panying note 73 infra.
71. The lower court found that twenty-five percent of Rhode Island's elementary stu-
dents attended nonpublic schools and ninety-five percent of these students attended Roman
Catholic schools. In Pennsylvania, contracts had been made with schools, most of which were
Roman Catholic, that enrolled more than twenty percent of the students in the state. 403 U.S.
at 602.
72. Even though the support was aimed at secular subjects or at teachers of these
subjects, the Court found that "a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated
with his or her faith and operated to incubate its tenets, will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral." Id. at 618.
73. Id. at 619.
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1319. Touching upon the Board's argument that it could avoid
"excessive entanglement" because it would resolve only factual issues, the Court said it was
"not compelled to determine whether the entanglement is excessive" but was making only a
"narrow inquiry whether the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction presents a significant risk
that the First Amendment will be infringed." Id. at 1319-20. The Chief Justice's opinion left
unclear what distinction exists between "excessive entanglement" and a "significant risk of
First Amendment infringement." His opinion also fails to indicate why the admitted interfer-
ence that would occur would significantly risk contravening the first amendment.
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teaching of otherwise secular subjects .7  The suggested entangle-
ment in Bishop of Chicago involved the supervision of elections and
the resolution of labor disputes on a case-by-case basis.7 Why this
kind of involvement, which on its face appears the same as the
admittedly legitimate intrusions of health and fire inspectors or of
those enforcing the compulsory attendance laws, is really the same
kind of entanglement as that envisioned in Lemon is not ex-
plained.77
The Court of Appeals' discussion of the constitutional issues in
Bishop of Chicago is an excellent example of the confusion gener-
ated in the wake of Yoder. 5 The court first noted that the activity
of the NLRB would constitute interference with the Bishop's free
exercise of his authority over the teachers in his diocese. The court
reasoned that the Board would inevitably become "entangled in
doctrinal matters if, for example, an unfair labor practice charge
followed the dismissal of a teacher. . . for teaching a doctrine that
has current favor with the public at large but is totally at odds with
the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith."7 The court added that in
such a case the Board would have to look into the real cause for
discharge, stating that "[tihe scope of this examination would nec-
essarily include the validity as a part of church doctrine of the
reason given for the discharge."8
75. As an example of possible mingling of religious belief and a secular subject, Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion in Lemon used an arithmetic problem: 'If it takes forty
thousand priests and a hundred and forty thousand sisters to care for forty million Catholics
in the United States how many more priests and sisters will be needed to convert and care
for the hundred million non-Catholics in the United States?' 403 U.S. at 634-35. There were
no findings that such teaching actually occurred in the instant school.
76. The most likely areas of conflict arising under the National Labor Relations Act
would be problems arising from a claim of unfair labor practices under § 8 and problems
arising from the selection and certification of a bargaining unit under § 9. See 29 U.S.C. §§
158, 159 (1976); Bastress, Government Regulation and the First Amendment Religion
Clauses-An Analysis of the NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools and Their Teachers,
17 DuQ. L. REv. 291 (1978-79); Kryvoruka, Church, the State and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: Collective Baigaining in the Parochial Schools, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 33 (1978);
Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and Parochial School Teachers, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 631 (1978).
77. The Court did note that resolution of some labor disputes would "necessarily in-
volve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its
relationship to the school's religious mission," and added that it was "not only the conclusions
that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses, but the very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions." 99 S. Ct. at
1320. Had the Court followed a free exercise analysis it might have averted to the view in
Yoder that, if a law is to be held unconstitutional, the state must be interfering with a
"legitimate religious belief"-a term covering both good faith and a causal connection be-
tween the individual's claim and established religious views. 406 U.S. at 214, 215-16.
78. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
79. 559 F.2d at 1125.
80. Id. It is unclear if "validity" referred to whether the reason for discharge actually
[Vol. 33:149
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Interference alone, however, is insufficient to render the activ-
ity unconstitutional, since there are some types of permissible gov-
ernmental infringement on the operation of church schools. These
include fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state
requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws."' The court
compared these legitimate interferences with those that the court
thought would be created by the Board's activity, concluding that
they were dissimilar because "[laws on matters such as fire
inspections. . . do not have the clear inhibiting potential upon the
relationship between teachers and employers with which the present
Board order is directly concerned. '8 2 The logic here is strained, if not
lacking. Admittedly, interfering with the Bishop's operation of the
school through imposition of a fire regulation or a building code and
inspecting to see that the regulation is followed is not the same as
interfering through regulation of labor-management relations. Ad-
mission that there is a difference, however, does not provide a reason
why one type of interference should be proscribed and another not.
The Court of Appeals also employed the "entanglement" ap-
proach of Lemon v. Kurtzman. " The court was no more instructive
than the Supreme Court in explaining why the "entanglement" was
"excessive" or even why it was basically similar to the type pro-
scribed in Lemon. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its argu-
ments, the court also touched briefly upon what might be called a
"compensatory justice" argument. Noting that religious groups
were forced to finance their schools without governmental aid be-
cause of religious permeation of the curriculum, the court stated
that such schools should "be equally freed of the obviously inhibit-
ing effect and impact of the restrictions of the National Labor Rela-
stemmed from church doctrine or whether the doctrine was itself true. There is evidence in
the opinion, however, that the court thought the Board would be forced to make decisions
on the truth of the doctrine itself rather than merely recognizing its existence. Discussing the
statement of the Board's counsel that the Board would "try to make some reasonable accom-
modation to the religious purposes of the school," id. at 1128, the court stated that a reasona-
ble accommodation on the presentation of a doctrinal issue in an unfair labor practice case
"would implicitly appear to us to involve the necessity of explanation and analysis, and
probably verification and justification, of the doctrinal precept involved . . . ." Id. at 1129
(emphasis added). Why the Board would have to "verify" and "justify" a religious doctrine,
however, is never made clear. If the Board had to "justify" the doctrine of the employer in
this case, then logically it would also have to "justify," for example, General Motors' intent
to manufacture Chevrolets, should the corporation ever discharge an employee who insisted
on making Fords instead. That, of course, would be nonsense. If, however, the Board does
not have to "justify" the religious doctrine, then it is not clear why the Board's interference
is impermissible.
81. Id. at 1124. See also 403 U.S. at 614.
82. 559 F.2d at 1124.
83. Id. at 1125-26.
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tions Act. . "84 On its face the statement is simply incomprehen-
sible, because there is no reason why, if a school is correctly denied
state aid as an unconstitutional establishment, it should receive
compensation in the form of an excuse from adhering to valid state
regulation. Furthermore, the court made its statement immedi-
ately after noting that "those who undertake to teach young people
in parochial schools which have been denied state aid because of
their pervasive religious nature are as such teachers denied the im-
portant protective rights of the National Labor Relations Act
. . "86 In protecting the free exercise rights of the church authori-
ties running the schools, the court thus appears willing to sacrifice
the teachers' rights to an admitted governmental benefit."7
F. Summary
Following Reynolds and Cantwell, interference with religious
belief was clearly prohibited by the free exercise clause and interfer-
ence with activity motivated by religious belief was prohibited if the
interference imposed a religious test. It was equally clear that state
restriction of the latter activity through general nondiscriminatory
laws would be tolerated under certain conditions." The important
free exercise clause decisions during the past two decades may be
seen as varied attempts to define the situations in which such state
restriction is constitutionally valid. Braunfeld left unclear whether
state interference would be tolerated if it merely had a "rational
basis"-was "not unreasonable"-of if a "balancing" test in which
the state interest is weighed against the harm done to the individual
right must be met.89 Sherbert opted for the "compelling state inter-
est" test. Yoder, stepping back from the near absolutism of
Sherbert, is probably best understood as applying a "balancing"
test, although the special circumstances and peculiar complexity of
the interests there render this view uncertain. These decisions,
however, have failed to present a clear set of neutral principles upon
84. Id. at 1130.
85. To the extent that there is validity in the argument that aid and regulation should
go hand-in-hand, the analysis offered in this Note implies that the establishment clause
rationale should be reexamined. If regulation for valid state purposes is constitutional, is it
not conceivable that aid for valid state purposes is also constitutional?
86. 559 F.2d at 1130.
87. The court did not advert to the fact that its position appears to be an implicit denial
of the holding in Sherbert, in which the Supreme Court held that Sherbert could not be
denied unemployment compensation by reason of her religious practices. See notes 37.42
supra and accompanying text.
88. See text accompanying notes 11-18 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 19-36 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 52-66 supra.
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which lower courts can base their decisions. This was evident in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Bishop of Chicago and by the Supreme
Court's subsequent failure to address the constitutional issue when
it reviewed the lower court's decision."1 Thus, the Court stands in
need of neutral principles upon which to decide free exercise contro-
versies.
III. GENERAL LAWS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:
A PARALLEL PROBLEM
Before proposing principles that could avoid the problems in-
herent in the Court's free exercise decisions, it is pertinent to exam-
ine how the Court has handled a parallel situation. Associated Press
v. NLRB12 presented the question whether the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as applied to the Associated Press, constituted an uncon-
stitutional abridgement of freedom of the press. 3 The Associated
Press contended that "there must not be the slightest opportunity
for any bias or prejudice personally entertained by an editorial
employee to color or distort what he writes" and claimed that it
"cannot be free to furnish unbiased and impartial news reports
unless it is equally free to determine for itself the partiality or bias
of editorial employees."'" The Court held that the NLRB's order
that the Associated Press reinstate the discharged employee was
constitutional, reasoning that there was no abridgment of freedom
of the press when the discharge was solely for union activity. 5 The
Court reasoned that " [t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws."" The Court noted,
however, that, if the discharge had resulted from the employee's
inability to implement his employer's policy of unbiased and impar-
tial reporting, any NLRB action interfering with such discharge
would have violated the employer's free press rights. 7 The parallel
between Associated Press and Bishop of Chicago is obvious: both
91. See text accompanying notes 67-86 supra.
92. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
93. The Associated Press had discharged an employee. The American Newspaper
Guild, a labor organization, then filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board,
claiming unfair labor practices. The Board issued a cease-and-desist order and enjoined
Associated Press to offer the employee reinstatement and back pay.
94. Id. at 131.
95. Id. at 132.
96. Id.
97. Id. Justice Sutherland, joined by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler,
dissented, arguing that freedom of the press was a fundamental liberty and that no govern-
mental restriction was permissible: "[d]ue regard for the constitutional guaranty requires
that the publisher. . . of news shall be free from resiraint in respect of employment in the
editorial force." Id. at 140.
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considered the impact of the same general nondiscriminatory law-
the National Labor Relations Act-upon a fundamental freedom;
yet the results are diametrically opposed.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court took note of
Associated Press in reaching their Bishop of Chicago decisions."
The lower court found the situations inapposite, stating that
"[f]ailure of a newspaper employee to carry out a publisher-
employer's policy would not bear on freedom of the press; a failure
of a lay teacher to carry out a bishop-employer's policy would di-
rectly interfere with the exercise of religion."9 Perhaps realizing
that the statement is not entirely clear, the court added that the
cases differed because, first, reasons for discharge in the case of news
media have nothing to do with freedom of the press, but doctrinal
reasons for discharge in the case of the religious schools would in-
volve the religion clauses, and second, the discharge in Associated
Press did not actually involve a claim of bias, whereas the
"necessity of bargaining and negotiating with faculty members on
conditions of employment inevitably involves . . infringement of
the First Amendment Religon Clauses."100 Neither point adequately
distinguishes the cases. On the first point, a reporter or editor would
certainly be as prone to maintain his or her own point of view, as
opposed to the publisher's order, as would a teacher in the face of a
bishop's commands. Thus, what constitutes an interference with
freedom of either religion or the press must be the same event: a
NLRB requirement that either the publisher or the bishop retain an
employee who allegedly frustrates the former's ability to promulgate
his views. If that interference is unconstitutional in the one case, it
is difficult to understand why it would not be unconstitutional in
the other.' As to the second point, it is immaterial whether one case
involved actual bias or not; rather, the issue is whether a particular
NLRB action unconstitutionally interferes with the employer's fun-
98. 559 F.2d at 1126; 99 S. Ct. at 1322.
99. 559 F.2d at 1127.
100. Id.
101. A dominant theme of the Court of Appeals' argument was that union activity by
the teachers would inevitably raise "working conditions" questions that involved church
doctrine. Id. at 1123. Surely it can be assumed that reporters and editorial workers are as
prone to raise policy questions in their bargaining over working conditions as are teachers.
To take comparable possibilities, why would NLRB protection of the attempts of liberal
reporters to influence a conservative paper's editorial policy through union activity be less
unconstitutional than the same protection afforded teachers attempting to influence a
bishop's religious views? Does the Seventh Circuit think that freedom of the press is only a
general freedom, rather than the freedom to publish certain specific views, so that only NLRB
ordered total cessation of publication would be unconstitutional rather than forced employ-
ment of a worker who frustrated publication of the employer's views? It is certainly not clear.
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damental liberty. If the employee's discharge results from his bias,
then NLRB action against the employer is an unconstitutional in-
fringement of either the latter's free exercise or free press rights. The
problem with the court's analysis is that it assumes that all dis-
charges of religious school teachers will inevitably result in a free
exercise violation, but does not make the same assumption as to
discharges of reporters. Instead, the court is willing to look at each
discharge of reporters to determine if there actually is an interfer-
ence. The court, however, offers no explanation for this disparate
treatment.
The Supreme Court was no more illuminating in its treatment
of the question raised by Associated Press. In Associated Press the
Board's jurisdiction was sustained because there was "nothing to
suggest that application of the Act would infringe First Amendment
guarantees . . . ." Whereas in Bishop of Chicago "the record af-
fords abundant evidence that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction
over teachers . ..would implicate the guarantees of the Religion
Clause. ' '11 2 The issue thus remains why there is an assumed infringe-
ment in one situation but not in the other.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Two Rejected Models
Two approaches to decisionmaking may be considered as possi-
ble models for the principled decisionmaking called for by Wechs-
ler.'13 Both the "compelling state interest" test used in Sherbert"'4
and the balancing approach used in Yoder '05 are sufficiently coher-
ent and well-developed to serve as models for future decisionmaking
in this area.'10 Before suggesting a third model, it is helpful to exam-
ine why these possible models should be rejected.
A starting point for any discussion of how the Court should deal
with conflicts between public policy and religious beliefs is Justice
Frankfurter's statement in McGowan v. Maryland that commends
itself both by its historical correctness and its sound common sense:
By its nature, religion-in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution
uses that word-is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly
102. 99 S. Ct. at 1322.
103. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
106. The "rational basis" test that may have been used in Braunfeld, is not considered
since the freedoms of the first amendment are sufficiently important to warrant more than




relates the life of man to the world in which he lives. Religious beliefs pervade,
and religious institutions have traditionally regulated, virtually all human
activity. It is a postulate of American life, reflected specifically in the First
Amendment to the Constitution but not there alone, that those beliefs and
institutions shall continue, as the needs and longings of the people shall inspire
them, to exist, to function, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever
innate strength they may contain their many influences upon men's conduct,
free of the dictates and directions of the state. However, this freedom does not
and cannot furnish the adherents of religious creeds entire insulation from
every civic obligation. As the state's interest in the individual becomes more
comprehensive, its concerns and the concerns of religion perforce overlap.
State codes and the dictates of faith touch the same activities. Both aim at
human good, and in their respective views of what is good for man they may
concur or they may conflict. No constitutional command which leaves religion
free can avoid this quality of interplay.'07
The Sherbert "compelling state interest" test, of course, does
not necessarily deny that there are occasions when state interference
with free exercise rights would be justified. The Court has had no
problem in holding certain state interests, such as public safety and
health, sufficiently compelling to justify some interference with reli-
gious liberty.' This test, however, fails as an appropriate model for
principled decisionmaking in the free exercise area for two reasons.
First, the test, as applied, has failed to recognize that governmental
action has become increasingly pervasive in all areas of human life.
As Frankfurter noted, the state's concerns and the concerns of reli-
gion overlap "[a]s the state's interest in the individual becomes
more comprehensive."''10 There is no doubt that the framers of the
Constitution would have no more difficulty than twentieth century
judges in recognizing a compelling interest when concerned with
prevention of disease or fire. It is equally clear, however, that the
contemporary regulatory and welfare apparatus would amaze those
same framers and probably would not represent to them a compel-
ling state interest. The effective and efficient rendering of such new
services is, nevertheless, as much a necessity in today's world as the
more traditional health and safety services. Thus, in practice the
"compelling state interest" test fails to recognize as compelling any-
thing but what today amounts to the barest necessity. In this light,
the test clearly provides no means by which a court can assess the
relatively compelling nature of a particular state interest in relation
to a particular religious interest. Unless one is to maintain that no
public interest justifies interference with religious freedom except
those few that all societies have always recognized as truly
"compelling," the test provides no means of evaluating the dynamic
107. 366 U.S. at 461-62 (separate opinion).
108. See, e.g., 403 U.S. at 614.
109. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
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relationship between governmental and religious interests.
The second reason for rejecting the "compelling state interest"
test is that it provides no norm for evaluating the extent to which a
genuinely compelling interest should be permitted to interfere with
free exercise rights. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Bishop of
Chicago acknowledged that compulsory school attendance laws are
permissible interferences with religious schools. '° If this were so
because the state interest in education was compelling, the same
compelling quality presumably would extend to the state's require-
ment of a number of days in attendance. Would it then be within
permissible constitutional limits for a religiously affiliated elemen-
tary school, which found that it could save scarce funds while still
meeting minimal achievement standards, to lose its state accredita-
tion because it held classes for only 120 days instead of 180 days?'
The basic problem is, if one accepts the Frankfurter overview, that
the context requires a balancing of the various interests. The
"compelling state interest" test is not a balancing test and cannot,
in practice or theory, adequately deal with the problems of infringe-
ment of free exercise rights by general nondiscriminatory laws.
The Yoder "balancing" test, however, is no more adequate as
a model for principled decisionmaking than the "compelling state
interest" test. The problem is not that the test itself has any inher-
ent theoretical faults. Rather, the problem is that the Court has
failed, apparently by design, to give the test a clear expression. The
reasons for that design perhaps can be drawn from Chief Justice
Burger's discussion of the religion clauses in Walz v. Tax
Commission.1 1 2 In Walz the Chief Justice asserted that "[t]he Es-
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are
not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution" and that
"[t]he considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation
to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general princi-
ples.""' The Chief Justice seems to be saying that, because the
110. 559 F.2d at 1124.
111. The question cannot be answered by turning to the "least restrictive alternative"
branch of the strict scrutiny analysis, see note 30 supra, because in such a quantitative
determination the "ends" and "means" are virtually indistinguishable, unless one is prepared
to contend that there is no contemporary state interest whatsoever in keeping children in
school for a certain period of the day and a certain length of time during the year, irrespective
of what the children learn during that time. For a discussion of reasons additional to academic
ones for compulsory state education requirements, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 227-
28.
112. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
113. Id. at 668.
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
religion clauses are cast in "absolute terms" and would tend to clash
with each other "if expanded to a logical extreme,""' 4 the Court
should discontinue its effort to differentiate the two clauses as pre-
cisely as possible. Whether that was really the intention of the Court
is not entirely clear. The practical effect of the Court's mingling of
the two clauses can be seen, however, in the Seventh Circuit's at-
tempt in Bishop of Chicago to apply the Supreme Court's mixture
of religion clause arguments. The Bishop of Chicago court finally
admitted that it had been unable to decide the case in terms of
either a free exercise or establishment clause analysis and had in-
stead relied on the religion clauses "jointly."
11 5
B. A Clarified "Balancing" Test
If one agrees that the very nature of the clash between general
nondiscriminatory laws and free exercise rights requires a balancing
test, then the Burger Court's choice of balancing was correct. If,
however, one also agrees that the choices within a balancing test
should be predictable rather than ad hoc, then the Burger Court's
test must be rejected because of its failure to provide a clear frame-
work. In light of this appraisal, the first and fundamental principle
is as follows:
(1) The decision in any controversy involving the impact
of a general nondiscriminatory law upon free exercise rights
must be based upon a balancing of the competing interests.
The most significant aspect of this basic principle-that which
makes it "neutral" and therefore initially acceptable to both sides
of a given controversy-is that it is not outcome determinative in
any substantive way. Prior to analysis of the various factors in a
given controversy, the principle does not operate in favor of any one
set of interests. The principle operates "instrumentally"-it com-
mands how the court is to reach its decision rather than what the
decision must be.115
A second principle would obviate the confusion generated by
114. Id. at 668-69.
115. 559 F.2d at 1131. In a decided understatement the court said that "[o]ur treat-
ment of the Religion Clauses jointly has been because of our belief that there has been some
blurring of sharply honed differentiations." Id.
116. It must be candidly admitted that instrumental principles may not have been
what Wechsler had in mind when he called for the use of neutral principles. Principles
governing how the Court approaches a controversy, however, are as much in need of neutrality
as are principles governing what the Court decides. Furthermore, the fact that neutral instru-
mental principles should guide the Court's approach does not preclude the development of
neutral principles for resolution of questions such as how important a given public policy is
or how useful or necessary chosen means to effect the policy are.
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the Yoder Court's use of balancing. The second principle is:
(2) In balancing the competing interests, the following factors
must always be considered:
(a) the public policy promoted by the law;
(b) the means used to achieve that policy;
(c) the causal relationship between belief and the restricted
activity;
(d) the harm done to religious belief.
It is immediately obvious that these factors involve, in so far as the
state interest is concerned, a consideration of both ends and means.
The factors also require the courts to scrutinize both the harm done
to the religious belief and the connection between the belief and the
particular action that is restricted by the state law.'17 The proposal
assumes that the court will attempt an evaluation of the importance
of the law's ends and means in relation to the contemporary situa-
tion and that the court will not hesitate to inquire into both the
existence of a given article of religious faith and the connection
between that article of faith and the action allegedly motivated by
it. The proposal does not suggest, however, that a court should make
any judgment concerning the truth of any religious belief."'
The final principle, perhaps more of a corollary of the first two
than a separate requirement, is:
(3) The "entanglement" argument should not be applied to
cases involving the impact of general nondiscriminatory laws on
free exercise rights.
Quite apart from the difficulties encountered in using this argu-
ment, " 9 the major objection to the "entanglement" argument is that
it adds nothing to the analysis provided by the preceding two princi-
ples. Although there may be some justification for discussing
"entanglement" in an establishment clause setting, it is unclear
how government interference with religious activity that is judged
constitutional under the proposed balancing test can then be at-
tacked because the interference involves "entanglement" between
government and religion. For instance, in the context of state aid
to parochial schools there is a direct church-state relationship-
the giving of funds. There is also a second-level relationship-
117. Thus, the position proposed here bears some marked similarity to the "sliding
scale" approach espoused by Justice Marshall for use in equal protection controversies. See
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
118. See note 80 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
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governmental surveillance to safeguard the proper use of funds.
Finally, there is a third-level relationship-the political process
engaged in by those seeking to obtain or deny access to funds. It
is primarily the second and third level relationships that generate
the forbidden "entanglement."'12 In the context of interference with
free exercise rights the supposed "entanglement" is nothing more
than the relationship generated by the impact of the general nondis-
criminatory law. Thus, there is no second or third level of relation-
ship. Finally, the "entanglement" argument is not saved by stating
that it is not any entanglement that is proscribed, but only
"excessive" entanglement. If the interference caused is "excessive"
entanglement, the same result should obtain upon consideration
under the second "neutral" principle of the ends and means of the
law and the harm done to the religious interest.
To better understand the proposal, it is helpful to survey the
probable results of imposition of these principles upon the recent
decisions in this area. The outcome in Braunfeld would almost cer-
tainly have been different. Although it remains clear that the public
interest in a standard day of rest is of some importance, it is uncer-
tain that the public interest would have been substantially harmed
had Pennsylvania allowed exceptions for nonSabbatarians, since a
considerable number of states other than Pennsylvania had done
so.' 2' In light of the clear nexus between the activity of the Orthodox
Jews and their religious beliefs as well as the substantial financial
harm they suffered in following those beliefs, it seems likely that a
balancing test would have resulted in the Sunday closing law being
struck down.
Meanwhile, the outcome in Sherbert would probably have re-
mained the same, but the underlying principles would have been
something other than the "compelling state interest" test that was
actually applied. Given the ease with which the State Commission
could have allowed an exception for those unemployed because of
religious reasons and the importance of abstention from work on
Saturday to a Seventh Day Adventist, it would have been relatively
easy for the Court to strike down the law under the proposed balanc-
ing test. Similarly, the outcome in Yoder would also have been
unchanged, although a decision using the proposed principles cer-
tainly would have clarified the reasoning behind the decision.
The Court of Appeals in Bishop of Chicago, using the proposal,
should have employed free exercise considerations rather than the
mixed religion clause considerations that the court actually used.
120. See 403 U.S. at 619-24.
121. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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Precisely what the outcome would have, or should have, been is
more difficult to predict than in the preceding cases. The court,
however, would have had to more carefully examine the harm done
to religious belief and the connection between the religious belief
and activity. For example, the need for church authorities to control
the labor-management relations with lay teachers in church oper-
ated schools may not result from any causal connection between
religious doctrine and the activity. The Roman Catholic Church
certainly has not proscribed membership in or dealings with unions
as a matter of faith.'22 Furthermore, there is no indication that the
hiring and firing of teachers is any more an intrinsically religious
activity than the building of a church or the sale of bingo cards. It
is fairly obvious, however, that a Board decision requiring a religious
school to retain a teacher who is in fact teaching what the particular
religious group considered antithetical to the faith would seriously
harm that group's ability to exercise their beliefs. Although an ex-
ception from the Board's normal procedures for discharges that in-
volve both "good cause" and anti-union bias"3 might itself raise an
establishment clause issue,Iu the decision in Sherbert"5 concerning
a similar establishment issue appears to preclude such an attack.
In any event, the free exercise issue would be separated from the
establishment issue and each could be resolved appropriately.
26
122. To the contrary, the Roman Catholic Church has been a solid supporter of the
labor movement in the United States. See, e.g., H. BROWNE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE
KNIGHTS OF LABOR (1949). See generally J. RYAN & J. HUSSLEIN, THE CHURCH AND LABOR (1920).
123. For a discussion of the problems generated by the application of the Board's
procedures to parochial schools in this situation, see Comment, supra note 76, at 649-58.
124. 559 F.2d at 1127-29. One commentator has said that
[a]Ithough there may be no reason in principle why the Board and the courts could not
carefully tailor the Board's jurisdiction to protect first amendment rights, such a process
is not necessarily benign in practice and may be costly, both financially and psychologi-
cally, for the free exercise of the religious mission of the schools.
Comment, supra note 76, at 661-62. But see Kryvoruka, supra note 76, at 83:
As in other sectors of the economy, the religious employer may not cherish the responsi-
bility to bargain with the elected representatives of its employees. This responsibility,
however, may not be avoided merely because the employer is affiliated with a church or
because its employees are working in a religiously associated environment. There is no
constitutional right to commit unfair labor practices.
125. 374 U.S. at 409-10.
126. The question of what principled methodology should be employed in establish-
ment clause controversies is beyond the scope of this Note. A brief survey of the line of cases
beginning with Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and moving through Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), to Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975),
however, suggests that Justice Stewart's 1963 comment concerning the Court's "wooden"




Decisions in the past decades involving the impact of general
nondiscriminatory laws on free exercise rights reveal that the Court
has been inconsistent at best. The Court itself has attempted to
establish a principled basis for its decisions, ranging from the "not
unreasonable" or "rational basis" standard of Braunfeld through
the "compelling state interest" test of Sherbert to the "balancing
test" manqu6 of Yoder. The net result of the Court's failure to
establish a clear set of neutral principles in this area has been thor-
ough confusion, such as that manifested by the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Bishop of Chicago, and the Supreme Court's own reluct-
ance to consider the issues therein.
The Court has an obligation both to make decisions and to
present reasons that make clear that the decisions are not the result
of temporary passion or reasoning not based upon the existing con-
sensus of national thought. This Note's proposal that interference
with free exercise rights caused by the unintended and incidental
impact of otherwise valid general laws should be subjected to a
balancing test with clearly articulated relevant factors may not gen-
erate immediate acceptability or predictability of decisions. In
time, however, it should have that effect and, to that extent, should
fulfill the reasonable and legitimate desires of those who believe
that principled decisionmaking is the sine qua non of the Court.
G. MICHAEL MCCROSSIN
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